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In a previous Evidence Speaks report, I described the high rates at which student loan borrowers default on 
their repayment within 12 years of initial college entry, often on relatively modest amounts of debt. One of the 
most striking patterns emerging from that report and other prior work is how dramatically default rates vary by 
institution sector and by race/ethnicity: black, non-Hispanic entrants and for-profit entrants experience default 
at much higher rates than other students. In this report, I use the same source of data to examine whether 
these disparities in default rates can be explained by other factors. I also examine what happens after a 
default, and whether this also varies by race or institution sector. 
 
I find that differences in student and family background characteristics, including measures of family income 
and wealth, can account for about half of the black-white gap in default (reducing it from 28 to 14 percentage 
points). But even accounting for differences in degree attainment, college GPA, and post-college income and 
employment cannot fully explain the black-white difference in default rates, which remains large and 
statistically significant at 11 percentage points in the most complete model.   
 
Similarly, differences in student and family background characteristics can account for slightly less than half 
of the gap in default rates between for-profit borrowers and public two-year college borrowers (reducing it 
from 25 to 14 percentage points). Somewhat surprisingly, the gap across sectors is not fully explained by 
differences in attainment, or by measures of employment and earnings. Entering a for-profit is associated 
with a 10-point higher rate of default even after accounting for everything else in the model.  
 
Adjusted and unadjusted gaps both provide important information; one is not more “correct” than the other. 
The adjustments are only as good as the measures included, and better data on earnings, employment, and 
other post-college circumstances might explain more of the gap. Differences in loan counseling or loan 
servicing might also play a role. The better we can understand what drives these stark gaps, the better 
policymakers can target their efforts to reduce defaults. 
 
An additional analysis of what happens post-default shows that more than half of all defaulters (54 percent) 
were able to successfully resolve at least one of their defaulted loans via rehabilitation, consolidation, paying 
in full, or having a loan discharged. At least 14 percent of defaulted borrowers managed to emerge from 
default and re-enroll in school. While there is no black-white difference in resolution rates conditional on 
default, white defaulters are more likely to rehabilitate defaulted loans while black defaulters are more likely 
to consolidate. Similarly, defaulters from for-profit institutions were more likely to consolidate and less likely to 
rehabilitate a defaulted loan than defaulters from public two-year institutions. 
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This report utilizes data released by the 
U.S. Department of Education in 
October 2017, linking survey and 
administrative data from the Beginning 
Postsecondary Student (BPS) surveys to 
administrative data on debt and defaults 
from the National Student Loan Data 
System (NSLDS). I focus on the BPS 
2003-04 survey sample, which is 
nationally representative of college 
entrants who enrolled for the first time in 
2003-04.1 Respondents were re-
surveyed in 2006 and 2009, and the 
NSLDS data are available through 2015, 
enabling certain outcomes to be 
measured up to 12 years after initial 
college entry. While some of the 
statistics reported below are publicly 
accessible from the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) using the 
online Power Stats tool, I have 
computed others using the individual-
level data which can only be obtained 
via a restricted-use data license. Where 
possible, I have validated my 
calculations using the restricted data 
against publicly available measures. 
 
Figure 1 below summarizes previously 
reported rates at which student 
experience a default within 12 years of 
entry, by sector and by race for the BPS-
2004 cohort. Figure 2 provides the same 
information, but limited to undergraduate 
borrowers only.2 The figures show that 
17 percent of all entrants (28 percent of 
undergraduate borrowers) experienced a 
default within 12 years of entry. The 
figures also highlight the stark disparities 
in default by sector and race/ethnicity. 
For-profit entrants are nearly four times 
as likely to experience a default 
compared to public two-year entrants 
(47 percent versus 13 percent), while 
black non-Hispanic entrants are more 
than three times as likely as white non-
Hispanic entrants to experience a default 
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Source: Author’s calculations using NCES Power 
Stats with BPS-04 data with NSLDS supplement. 
 
 
What accounts for patterns 
of student loan default by 




Institution sector and race/ethnicity are 
clearly important correlates of student 
loan default. But to what extent might 
these differences be explained by other 
student characteristics? And since these 
two factors are clearly not determinative, 
what other characteristics or 
experiences might help explain patterns 
of default, even for students within a 
given sector or of a given race/ethnicity? 
The goal of the analyses conducted 
below is not to attempt to identify “causal 
impacts” of given factors on default, but 
rather to better understand the 
constellation of factors that can or 
cannot explain the stark gaps across 
race and sector. For example, if racial or 
sectoral gaps could be explained fully by 
differences in degree attainment, policy 
attention might be best directed toward 
what happens during college than what 
happens after.  
 
In order for a given factor to explain 
these gaps, two things must be true: the 
factor must be associated with likelihood 
of default, and the prevalence of the 
factor must differ across groups. Prior 
work has identified a range of factors 
predicting default, many of which are not 
terribly surprising. In addition to 
institutional sector and race, students’ 
age and gender, parental income and 
education, degree attainment, prior 
credit scores, and labor market 
outcomes are all related to default.3  
 
One well-documented result that many 
do find surprising is that the amount of 
debt students hold is if anything 
inversely related to default rates—that is, 
those with more debt are significantly 
less likely to default.4 This pattern is 
driven by the fact that students with 
larger balances also tend to have much 
higher levels of attainment and 
earnings.5  After controlling for 
attainment, prior work has found that the 
inverse relationship goes away, but the 
remaining correlation between debt size 
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Deming, Goldin, and Katz (2012) 
perform a similar analysis of sectoral 
gaps in three-year cohort default rates 
using institution-level data, and find that 
the gap between for-profits and other 
sectors cannot be explained by 
differences in student composition and 
other institution-level characteristics.7 
The new linkage of the student-level 
BPS data with the NLSDS provides the 
opportunity to examine the drivers of 
default for a relatively recent college 
entry cohort, over an extended period of 
time, and with the ability to consider an 
unusually rich set of survey and 
administrative variables as potential 
explanatory factors. Using the same 
data employed here, Kelchen (2018) 
finds that racial gaps in default cannot 
be fully explained by other factors, 
though I will include a more 
comprehensive set of measures.8 
 
In order to understand what is driving 
sectoral and racial gaps in default rates, 
I first run a regression predicting the 
likelihood of ever experiencing a default 
within 12 years as a function of the 
richest set of predictors available.9 I limit 
the sample to students who ever 
borrowed for undergraduate education. 
The full set of predictors included, along 
with their relationship to the likelihood of 
default, can be found in Appendix Table 
A1. In brief, the analysis includes: 
 
 Student and family background 
characteristics. These 
characteristics, measured in the 
first year of enrollment, include 
race/ethnicity, gender, age and 
age-squared, whether the student 
was classified as dependent, EFC 
(this is a summary measure of 
financial need driven primarily by 
family income)10, whether or not 
parents owned a home, parents’ 
highest level of education, 
whether parents provided 
financial support, SAT scores or 
equivalent when available, and an 
indicator for whether or not the 
student had a credit card in the 
first year of college. 
 Undergraduate borrowing. The 
regression includes the total 
amount borrowed for 
undergraduate education, as well 
as this amount squared to allow 
for the relationship to be non-
linear. 
 Institution sector and selectivity. 
The regression includes 
indicators for whether the first 
institution was for-profit, public 
four-year, and private not-for-
profit institutions, with public two-
year entrants as the reference 
group. Four year institutions are 
additionally distinguished by level 
of selectivity. 
 College performance and 
attainment. The regression 
includes indicators for the highest 
level of attainment at the time of 
the six-year follow-up survey 
(2009), including whether the 
respondent was still enrolled, and 
with BA/BS attainment as the 
reference group. I also include 
last known GPA as of the six year 
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follow-up survey (this variable is 
primarily derived from student 
transcripts, not self-reports).11 
 Measures of employment, 
earnings, and debt-to-income 
ratios. The regression includes 
self-reported employment and 
earnings (for those not still 
enrolled) at the time of the 6-year 
follow up (2009), as well as 
measures of monthly loan 
repayment amounts, and debt-to-
income ratios. Unfortunately, the 
data do not include measures of 
employment or earnings beyond 
2009.  
 
Even as measures of correlation rather 
than causation, individual coefficients 
from these regressions should be 
interpreted cautiously, because some 
factors in the model are closely related 
to each other. When this happens, the 
model cannot always distinguish which 
of the related factors is driving the 
association.  
 
The results confirm previously 
established patterns by race, institution 
sector, and attainment, as well as by 
measures of financial need (EFC), but 
also add some new details. For those 
with SAT or ACT score data, scores are 
not significantly related to default holding 
all else constant, but last known college 
GPA is, with each GPA point associated 
with an 8-percentage-point lower rate of 
default. Proxies for parental wealth—
including parental homeownership, 
parental education, and how much 
financial help parents provided to 
students while enrolled—are significantly 
negatively related to likelihood of default, 
even after controlling for everything else 
in the model. For example, students 
whose parents owned their home at 
college entry are 3 percentage points 
less likely to experience a default 
holding all else constant.  
 
Finally, the full model indicates default is 
still significantly negatively correlated 
with undergraduate borrowing and 
default (with an additional $10,000 of 
debt associated with a 4-point lower rate 
of default), even after controlling for 
other factors including attainment.12 
However, default is significantly 
positively correlated with debt-to-income 
ratios, highlighting the role of capacity to 
repay: a 10 point increase in this ratio 
associated with a 2-points higher rate of 
default.13  One surprising result is that 
being employed in 2009 is positively 
associated with defaulting within 12 
years. This could be because those not 
employed in 2009 are more likely to 
acquire further education and have less 
time in repayment.     
 
Can these factors explain 
institutional and racial/ 





I next examine the extent to which the 
dramatic disparities in default rates by 
sector and race can be explained by 
differences in student/family 
background, amounts borrowed, college 
achievement and attainment, and post-
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college earnings and employment. To do 
this, I run a series of regressions similar 
to above, but adding predictors step-by-
step in groups. For example, to examine 
disparities in default by sector, I first run 
a probit regression including only a set 
of indicators for institution type. The 
resulting coefficients describe the 
unadjusted differences in default rates 
by sector, as compared with the default 
rate in the reference group (in this case 
public two-year institutions). I then add 
additional predictors in the groups 
described above and evaluate how 
much the coefficients on the sector 
indicators change. 
 
The results for institution sector are 
summarized in Figure 3 (full regression 
results are available in Appendix Table 
A2). The first set of columns shows the 
unadjusted gaps in default rates for 
undergraduate borrowers from each 
sector, as compared with the rate for 
borrowers who entered public two-year 
colleges (26 percent). The second set of 
columns shows how the gaps change 
after adding student and family 
background characteristics. Interestingly, 
while four-year college borrowers have 
lower unadjusted default rates than 
public two-year college borrowers, this 
advantage is completely eliminated after 
accounting for differences in student and 
family background across sectors. The 
for-profit disadvantage shrinks, but at 14 
percentage points still remains large and 








Source: Author’s calculations using restricted-
use BPS-2004/09 data with NSLDS loan 
supplement. Coefficients are from a probit 
regression and are expressed as average 
marginal effects. See Appendix Tables A2 and 
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Adding additional controls for amounts 
borrowed, attainment, and GPA does 
little to further explain the for-profit 
disadvantage.14 The richest model, 
including controls for employment in 
2009 and debt-to-income ratios, shrinks 
the gap modestly to 11 percentage 
points, but if for-profit entrants have 
lower employment and earnings than 
other borrowers with similar 
characteristics, this could well be a 
consequence of for-profit enrollment 
rather than a mitigating explanatory 
factor.   
 
In Figure 4, I repeat the same exercise 
to examine racial disparities. The first set 
of columns shows the differences in 
default rates by race/ethnicity, as 
compared with the rate for white non-
Hispanic borrowers (21 percent).15 The 
second column accounts for additional 
student and family background 
measures that may differ by race. 
Adding these measures explains about 
half of the black-white gap and more 
than 80 percent of the Hispanic-white 
gap, but none of the white-Asian gap. 
Accounting for differences in amounts 
borrowed has little additional effect. 
Accounting for sector, selectivity, 
attainment, and GPA reduces the 
measured black-white gap a bit further. 
Interestingly, accounting for job status 
and debt-to-income ratios hardly 
changes the black-white gap at all after 
everything else is included. The richest 
model still leaves a large, statistically 
significant 11 percentage point black-
white gap in likelihood of default, while 
the adjusted gap between white 
borrowers and those of Asian or Pacific 
Islander descent is 9 percentage points. 
 
Some important caveats are required for 
interpretation. First, because many 
predictors are correlated with each 
other, the order in which predictors are 
added matters. Attainment and earnings 
may have relatively little additional 
explanatory power, not because they 
don’t matter, but simply because their 
effect has already been captured by 
other variables. In fact, in results not 
shown, I find that differences in sector, 
selectivity, and attainment, if added on 
their own, can explain almost half the 
black-white gap.16  Second, predictive 
models are only as good as the 
measures that are included, and 
additional or more precise measures 
might reduce gaps further.17 The 2009 
measures of employment and income, in 
particular, are less than ideal because 
they are self-reported at a time when 
many in the sample have not yet entered 
repayment, and many are still enrolled in 
school.18  
 
Finally, while the adjusted and 
unadjusted gaps presented here provide 
distinct information, one is not 
necessarily more correct or more useful 
than the other. For example, even if the 
black-white gap in default could be fully 
explained by family income and wealth, 
this would not make it any less 
problematic for black borrowers who 
cannot change their family background. 
Moreover, borrowing, degree attainment 
and earnings are themselves potential 
functions of race and/or institution 
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sector. To the extent that controlling for 
these factors reduces the gap in default, 
it simply shifts the question to why there 
are gaps in these predictors. 
 
What happens to defaulters 




The high rates of default among black 
borrowers and those attending for-profit 
colleges is cause for concern due to the 
potential financial ramifications of 
default. When a student loan enters 
default, the entire balance becomes 
immediately due, and borrowers lose 
access to options that might otherwise 
have applied, such as deferment and 
forbearance.19 If the borrower does not 
make arrangements with their servicer to 
get out of default, the loan may go to 
collections. Fees of up to 25% of the 
balance due may be added as a result.20 
Defaulting on a student loan can also 
lower credit scores, making it harder to 
access credit or even to rent an 
apartment in the future. In some states, 
default can lead to revocation of 
professional licenses, and credit 
histories may be evaluated as part of 
employment applications, making it 
harder to find or keep a job. Also, 
students cannot receive any additional 
federal student aid while they are in 
default, making it more difficult to return 
to school.   
 
Still, default is a status, not a permanent 
characteristic, and many students who 
experience a default do eventually 
emerge from it. In fact, more than half of 
those of those who ever defaulted (54 
percent) were able to resolve at least 
one of those defaults by the end of the 
12-year follow up, and at least 14 
percent returned to school after a 
default.21 There are four ways to get out 
of default: rehabilitation, consolidation, 
paying in full, or having a loan 
discharged.  
 
Rehabilitation offers the advantage of 
having the default removed from the 
borrower’s credit record, but it requires 
successfully making 9 payments over 10 
months, and can only be used once. 
Consolidating defaulted loans into a new 
loan can get a borrower out of default 
more quickly and may be the only 
feasible option for those with multiple 
defaulted loans, but the default remains 
on the credit record for up to 7 years.  
 
Figure 5 shows the percentage of 
defaulted students who were ever able 
to successfully resolve a defaulted loan 
by the end of the 12-year follow up, as 
well as the percentage ever emerging 
from default via one of these pathways, 
by race/ethnicity. Though black 
borrowers have a much higher rate of 
default in the first place, black and white 
defaulters emerge from default at similar 
rates, while Hispanic defaulters were 
slightly more likely to resolve a default.22 
At the end of the follow-up period, about 
54 percent of white defaulters had 
resolved at least one defaulted loan, 
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Source: Author’s calculations using NCES Power 
Stats with BPS-04 data with NSLDS supplement. 
 
Black and white defaulters differ, 
however, in how they emerge from 
default: black defaulters are more likely 
to get out of default via consolidation (23 
versus 15 percent), while white 
defaulters are more likely to rehabilitate 
(32 versus 26 percent) or pay in full (34 
versus 30 percent).23 Since rehabilitation 
can only be used once, I also examine 
patterns of resolution for the first 
defaulted loan (not shown), and find that 
the same general pattern holds. 
 
Figure 6 shows the same statistics for 
defaulters by first institution sector. 
Defaulters from private institutions—
whether for-profit or not-for-profit—were 
more likely to resolve a default than 
defaulters from public institutions. These 
defaulters were also more likely than 
those from public institutions to resolve 
via a consolidation. Again, this pattern 








Source: Author’s calculations using NCES Power 
Stats with BPS-04 data with NSLDS supplement. 
 
Future work could apply methods similar 
to those used above in order to better 
understand the predictors and 
consequences of consolidation versus 
rehabilitation among defaulted 
borrowers. Preliminary analysis (not 
shown) indicate that defaulters that 
resolve their first defaulted loan via 
consolidation have larger total balances 
at the time of default than those who 
rehabilitate ($19,185 versus $17, 124), 
are more likely to have experienced 
multiple instances of default (56 percent 
versus 41 percent), and more likely to 
receive federal student aid post-default 
(26 percent versus 14 percent).24 While 
the interpretation of these findings is not 
fully clear, it is consistent with 
consolidation being the more appealing 
option for defaulted borrowers with 
multiple defaulted loans, and also for 
defaulters who seek to re-enroll in 
college (since consolidation can happen 
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A number of key findings emerge from 
this analysis. First, about half of the total 
black-white gap in default rates, and just 
under half of the gap between for-profits 
and public two-year colleges, can be 
explained by student and family 
background including measures of 
parental wealth and support. Second, 
adding additional controls reduces both 
gaps further; yet even controlling for 
degree attainment, GPA, and measures 
of 2009 employment, earnings, and 
debt-to-income ratios cannot fully 
explain either gap. Finally, more than 
half of defaulted borrowers are able to 
resolve at least one of their defaulted 
loans within the 12-year follow-up 
window, with black defaulters and those 
from private institutions more likely than 
other groups to resolve via 
consolidation. 
 
Adjusted and unadjusted gaps both 
provide important information; one is not 
more “correct” than the other. The 
adjustments are only as good as the 
measures included, and because some 
of the predictors are correlated with each 
other, the order in which groups of 
predictors are added can matter. For 
example, differences in college sector, 
selectivity, and attainment explain more 
of the black-white gap in default when 
these predictors are added prior to 
adding student/family background 
characteristics.  
 
What could explain the remaining gaps 
in default? Better measures of income 
and other post-college financial factors 
would further explain the gap, as might 
more information about the timing of 
when students left school and when they 
entered repayment. Some of the 
remaining gap may relate to the quality 
of loan exit counseling or loan servicing, 
which could vary by race or sector. 
Indeed, other research has found 
significant variation in repayment 
outcomes across the individual loan 
servicing agents that communicate with 
borrowers.25  
 
This report also shows that more than 
half of defaulted borrowers are able to 
resolve at least one of their defaulted 
loans, though resolution does not 
necessarily erase the consequences of 
default. Conditional on experiencing a 
default, the likelihood of resolution does 
not vary by race, but those who attended 
private institutions (whether for-profit or 
not-for-profit) are more likely to resolve a 
defaulted loan. The pathway to 
resolution varies both by race and 
sector: compared with other students, 
consolidation is more common for black 
defaulters and those from private 
institutions.  
 
A final caveat is that this report has 
focused on default rather than 
repayment. Just because a student is 
not in default, does not necessarily 
mean they are paying down their loan. 
And while defaults may be of greatest 
consequence to borrowers, repayment 
rates are a legitimate concern for 
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policymakers and taxpayers. A similar 
analysis of predictors of successful 
repayment would further enrich our 
understanding of student loan outcomes. 
Qualitative research to illuminate how 
students transition from school into 
repayment, and so often into default and 
then back out again, would also be very 
valuable. The better we can understand 
what drives these patterns, the better 
policymakers can target their efforts to 
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Appendix Table A1. Predicting default within 12 years of entry (undergraduate borrowers only) 
 
Source: Author's calculations using BPS-2004 data with NSLDS supplement using WTA000. Notes: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are from a probit regression, expressed as average marginal 
effects on the probability of default of a one-unit increase in the predictor.  The source variable for ever 
defaulted within 12 years is s15evrdef_12y. Sample size is rounded to the nearest 10. 
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Appendix Table A2. Explaining patterns of default across sectors (undergraduate borrowers only) 
 
Source: Author's calculations using BPS-2004 data with NSLDS supplement using WTA000. Notes: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are from a probit regression, expressed as average marginal 
effects on the probability of default of a one-unit increase in the predictor.  The source variable for ever 
defaulted within 12 years is s15evrdef_12y. Sample size is rounded to the nearest 10. 
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Appendix Table A3. Explaining patterns of default by race/ethnicity (undergraduate borrowers 
only) 
 
Source: Author's calculations using BPS-2004 data with NSLDS supplement using WTA000. Notes: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are from a probit regression, expressed as average marginal 
effects on the probability of default of a one-unit increase in the predictor.  The source variable for ever 
defaulted within 12 years is s15evrdef_12y. Sample size is rounded to the nearest 10 




                                                                
1 I apply the sample weight WTA000 to all analyses. 
2 This excludes a small number of borrowers who borrowed for graduate school, but not for undergraduate education.  
3 For a review of this literature through 2008, see Jacob PK Gross, Osman Cekic, Don Hossler, and Nick Hillman (2010), 
"What matters in student loan default: A review of the research literature." Journal of Student Financial Aid 39, no. 1: 19-29. 
For an analysis of predictors of default and repayment at the institutional level, see Robert Kelchen and Amy Y. Li. (2017), 
"Institutional Accountability: A Comparison of the Predictors of Student Loan Repayment and Default Rates." The ANNALS of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 671, no. 1: 202-223. For an analysis of credit scores and student loan 
defaults, see Alvaro Mezza and Kamila Sommer (2015), “A Trillion Dollar Question: What Predicts Student Loan 
Delinquencies?,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-098. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.  
4 Meta Brown, Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Joelle Scally, and Wilbert van der Klaauw (February 19, 2015), “Looking 
at Student Loan Defaults through a Larger Window,” Liberty Street Economics Blog, New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York; Susan Dynarski (January 7, 2016), “The trouble with student loans? Low earnings, not high debt,” Evidence Speaks, 
Washington, DC: Brookings; Adam Looney and Constantine Yannelis (2015), “A crisis in student loans? How changes in the 
characteristics of borrowers and in the institutions they attended contributed to rising loan defaults,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, Washington, DC: Brookings. 
Mezza & Sommer (2015).  
5 Mezza & Sommer (2015); Looney & Yannelis (2015). 
6 Mezza & Sommer (2015). 
7 Deming, David J., Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz. "The for-profit postsecondary school sector: Nimble critters or 
agile predators?." Journal of Economic Perspectives 26, no. 1 (2012): 139-64. They find a much smaller gap between for-
profits and other sectors to begin with (only about 5 percentage points higher than public two-year colleges and 11 points 
higher than public four-year colleges), likely because the three-year cohort default rate does not capture defaults that occur 
beyond the three-year window or that occur but are resolved within the window.  
8 Robert Kelchen (February 13, 2018), “Examining Long-Term Student Loan Default Rates by Race and Ethnicity,” 
https://robertkelchen.com. 
9 The results presented are average marginal effects from a probit regression. Probit regression is a regression method 
suitable for predicting binary outcomes such as the probability of default. The average marginal effects from a probit 
regression measure how much the probability of default changes, on average, for a one-unit increase in a given predictor 
holding everything else constant. In sensitivity analyses not shown here, I also ran linear probability models using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression. The resulting findings were qualitatively similar, but the probit regressions explain slightly 
more of the variation in default rates as compared with OLS models.  
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include some measures which are tightly related, making it difficult to interpret some measures such as income, 
undergraduate borrowing, and debt-to-income measures in isolation. When debt and debt-to-income ratios are included, 
income on its own is negatively, but not significantly related to default, but its role may be primarily picked up via the debt-
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14 Note that I exclude selectivity indicators from this set of models, as they are tightly linked with institution sector.  
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predicted default rate 24 points higher than those who did not default (a perfect model would have an R-squared of one, 
though in practice an R-squared of 0.24 is quite good for a binary outcome variable). 
18 Indeed, even if I add the earnings/employment measures on their own, they still explain relatively little of the gaps either 
by sector or by race, suggesting their limited role is not only because of the other measures in the model. In order to include 
this as a predictor in the model, those still enrolled in school are assigned an income of zero and the model includes a 
separate indicator for those still enrolled in school.  
19 Information on what happens after a default is summarized by the U.S. Department of Education here: 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/default/collections.  
20 Collection costs policies as summarized by the U.S. Department of Education: 
https://myeddebt.ed.gov/borrower/collectionCostsNavigate.  
21 Specifically, 14 percent of defaulters received federal Pell grants or new student loans after a default. Other students may 
have returned to school without receiving federal aid.  
22 Sample sizes were too small for defaulters of Asian/Pacific Islander descent to include in this figure.  
23 Note that because borrowers may default multiple times or on multiple loans, the percentages describing pathways out of 
default add up to more than the total percentage no longer in default. Some defaulters may use more than one pathway, 
and some of those that use a pathway previously may re-default and still be in default at the end of the follow-up.  
24 I treat defaults that occurred in the same month as one instance of default. 
25 Daniel Herbst (2018), “Liquidity and Insurance in Student Loan Contracts: Estimating the Effects of Income-Driven 
Repayment on Default and Consumption,” unpublished manuscript, Princeton University. 
